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Abstract. Web-browser security with emphasis on JavaScript security,
is one of the important problems of the modern world. The potency
of information flow control (IFC) in the context of JavaScript is quite
appealing. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to help track and
learn from information flows. This learnt data can subsequently be used
to create a more adaptive and effective IFC model. As the information
about a function augments, potential leaks are also thwarted.
1 Introduction
The state of the internet has been evolving with the constant sharing of content
and functionalities between websites. Many modern technologies proposed in
HTML5 have served to increase capabilities of the browser while also raising
new possibilities for information leakages. For example, LocalStorage provides
an efficient way for persistence in the web-browser. This could cause browser-side
persistent cross-site scripting if not sanitized properly. Another example is the
use of WebSockets, which provides a real-time communication channel to the
server. Once the channel is open, further messages in the channel do not require
re-authenticaion or cookies since the connection is already established. There is
hence a clear need to monitor the browser at a variable level as JavaScript slowly
dominates the application space.
Web-browser vulnerabilities have constantly been cited among the top preva-
lent threats as seen clearly in lists such as the OWASP Top Ten 1. Despite the
numerous safeguards proposed over the years, including some important consid-
erations such as the ”same-origin policy” and ”content security policy”, these
threats continue exist. Moreover it is important to have a method to provide
security while preserving the user experience. It is our sincere belief that Infor-
mation Flow Control (IFC) could be an effective solution to this problem.
This paper is a logical extension an approach called Address Split Design
(ASD) proposed by Deepak et. al. [12]. In ASD, the authors show how the use of
IFC can prevent unauthorized code from accessing sensitive information thereby
protecting leakage of sensitive information. ASD maintains a dummy/public
value for every secret variable and uses this public value in case of unauthorized
1 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
access. In this paper, we first propose a change to how ASD maintains runtime
monitoring. This proposal could reduce the number of operations that need
to be performed when a secret variable is updated. In this next part of the
paper, we describe a learning-based approach to information flow control on a
web-browser. After the initial execution of a program using ASD, information
regarding the propagation of the secret is remembered. This information is used
in a self correcting mechanism for the analysis and enforcement of security on an
interpreted language such as JavaScript. The bedrock of our proposed mechanism
lies in correcting any possible leak through learning rather than using rigid
security guarantees. Hence, in this paper, we first start with ASD as the base
model and remember all the flow propagations which are used subsequently
thereby accounting for all possible information flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The section 2 provides a sum-
mary of the various related work. This is followed by a description of our model,
address split design with dependency graphs (ASD-DG), along with relevant
formalisms, in section 3. The details on how reinforcement learning is applied to
ASD-DG and the security guarantees that can be obtained because of learning
are described in section 4. There is a sum up of our approach in section 5.
2 Related work
There have been several key research since the models such as Bell and La
Padula [4], and Biba [5] that have helped in shaping the field of Information
Flow Control (IFC). These models established various levels of privileges and
associated information to these levels. A common mechanism to achieve this
is to attach security labels to information containers such as files or variables.
The most simple example consists of two security labels namely, “high/sensitive”
and “low/public”. Information cannot flow from “High” level containers to “Low”
level containers while the vice-versa is permissible. In a lattice-based design, the
security lattice can contain multiple parallel or intertwined levels allowing for
more complex information flow control design.
The first step in an IFC approach is to specify a policy. It consists first
in defining different security labels in a lattice-based structure and then to at-
tach these labels to the containers according to their sensitivity. Once a policy
has been specified, the IFC model ensures that the execution conforms to the
policy. Such an approach helps to classify information flows into legal and ille-
gal flows. IFC models have varying mechanisms to deal with illegal information
flows. These could be raising alerts, stopping execution, stopping the compilation
process, modifying execution or some other customized action.
Language based IFC has been explored in great detail by label based ap-
proaches as illustrated by Sabelfeld and Myers [11]. In these approaches, the
secret variables are tagged with security labels and these labels are propagated
along with the information flows. In the context of IFC in JavaScript, Bielova
et. al. [6] provide a substantive survey with comparative studies on techniques,
types of analysis (i.e. static vs. dynamic approaches) and their formal guaran-
tees. This work has been instrumental in providing a complete picture of this
research area thereby becoming a valuable stepping stone to the design of our
approach.
In the field of IFC, the most important property to be satisfied by any analysis
is non-interference. There are two types of non-interference based on the con-
ditions satisfied, namely Termination-insensitive non-interference (TINI) and,
Timing- and Termination-sensitive non-interference (TTSNI).
TINI [1,6,11,7] is a security guarantee where, for two terminating executions
of a program with the same public input, the observable public output remains
unchanged regardless of the value of the secret.
TTSNI [7,10] is a security guarantee where, for two executions of a program
with the same public input, the public output, the number of execution steps
and time taken to generate the public output remain unchanged regardless of
the value of the secret.
There are several IFC models that have been designed for the web-browser
taking into account the nature of JavaScript. Relative work in this domain
has been heavily biased towards dynamic approaches. This is justifiable by the
highly dynamic nature of JavaScript which increases the complexity for static
approaches thereby making dynamic approaches more effective.
Label-based approaches have always been in the forefront of dynamic ap-
proaches. In the context of JavaScript, Austin and Flanagan proposed the no-
sensitive-upgrade [2]. Hedin and Sabelfeld [9] proposed an IFC approach for
JavaScript based on a classical label-based approach previously described by
Sabelfeld and Myers [11]. Hedin and Sabelfeld show the need for dynamic ap-
proaches by describing problem of the information-flow being flow sensitive in
JavaScript. This increases the need to keep track of changing labels throughout
the execution which becomes tedious with pure static approaches. The difference
between the two approaches is that Hedin and Sabelfeld allow some upgrade in-
structions before the behest of the implicit information-flow. This means that,
in case an implicit flow results owing to the value of a secret variable, the pub-
lic output of a public value cannot be performed under any scenario in case of
the no-sensitive-upgrade. However, in case of Hedin and Sabelfeld, such a public
output can be allowed if and only if there was an explicit upgrade instruction
before the output statement is performed.
Both these label based approaches stop further execution of a program when
they encounter a possible information leak. These approaches are useful to check
if a program is adherent to TINI by default without any modifications. However,
they fail to continue execution of the program if there is a possibility of a leak.
There exist a few dymanic preventive enforcement mechanisms in JavaScript
which are able to continue execution of the program and still prevent informa-
tion leakage. These mechanisms maintain more than one copy of the variable
and switch contexts of the variable based on the scenario. In case there is an
unauthorized public output of a secret variable, these mechanisms use a dum-
my/public value instead. Secure Multi-Execution (SME), faceted approach and
Address Split Design (ASD) are the models known to use this approach.
The model of SME was proposed by Devriese and Piessens [7]. In SME, the
information flow across labels is segregated at the process level by providing
a separate process for each level of sensitivity. Let us consider a system with
two levels namely a high and a low. Such a scenario would imply that there
is a dedicated process for high level computations and a dedicated process for
low computations. This ensures that the memory is also safely handled since
the processes themselves are isolated. The low level process is the only one that
can influence public output and it can only receive public input. FlowFox is a
concrete implementation of SME on the Firefox web browser by De Groef et
al. [8]. However, the use of SME automatically increases the time- and space-
complexity for the system.
The faceted approach that has been proposed by Austin et al. [3,2] is the
chief proponent of the multi-path execution approach. The authors attempt to
mimic the functionality of SME with the use of a single process. It would in-
tuitively result in a much lower time complexity. The faceted approach attains
termination-insensitive non-interference since the use of a single process cannot
account for timing-sensitivity. This approach works on containing multiple copies
of the variables at each juncture to mimic the values of the variables in different
processes in case of SME. A faceted value is represented as <p?aprivate:apublic>
where p is the principal. The principal is an access control object which deter-
mines which copy of the variable should be used. If an object c were created by
using two other objects a and b, each with its own principal, there would be four
possible values for this object, as shown in [FACETED APPROACH] . This growth in
[FACETED APPROACH]
var a = ⟨p1?1 : 2⟩; var b = ⟨p2?3 : 4⟩; var c = a+b;
=> c = ⟨ p1 ? ⟨ p2 ? 4 : 5 ⟩ : ⟨ p2 ? 5 : 6 ⟩ ⟩;
the number of objects is exponential. The positive effect of this phenomenon is
that, only the correct copy of the object is used when it is invoked by the public
output function. Just like the SME approach, the execution of multiple branches
can have unintended consequences in a dynamic approach. The ZaphodFacets2
is an implementation of the faceted approach as a plug-in in Firefox. It use the
Narcissus JavaScript engine3. Cross-site scripting is handled effectively by this
approach by assigning each domain into separate principal. Variables from each
domain are accessed only if there is access to that principal hence significantly
reducing the effects of XSS.
The ASD was proposed by Deepak et. al. [12] and forms the first basis for the
approach described in this paper. In this approach each secret variable is split
2 https://github.com/taustin/ZaphodFacets
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissus_(JavaScript_engine)
into public and private values. ASD is similar to the faceted approach in terms
of having a single process and different values for private variables. However, the
key difference is that a variable can have only one private value in ASD while the
faceted approach could force it to have multiple private values. Further, ASD
does not execute additional branches based on the split values.
ASD seems to provide a more fine-grained IFC with function level control
and its performance degradation is much more acceptable than competing ap-
proaches [12]. However, this approach does not adhere to TINI; though the secret
is never given as a public output. Therefore, it suffers from lower security guar-
antees than SME while offering being practical. The core of this model starts
with a split variable which is represented as ⌈publicp ∥ privates⌋. The split vari-
able consists of a public value and a private value which are stored in different
memory locations. The default symbol table connects the variable to its public
value while the ASD mechanism overloads the symbol table at appropriate junc-
tures to change the inferred memory location. This information is maintained in
a data-structure called a dictionary that is unique to each function defined in
the policy.
ASD’s policies allow a differentiation to read and write accesses to secret
variables. These policies hence result in more fine-grained IFC which we find
to be suitable as a base for our model. The working of ASD is shown in the
figure 1. There policies and the JavaScript program are the input. The monitor
which is added to the JavaScript compiler interprets these policies and creates
data-structures called dictionaries. The variables which contain secret values are
split to show public and private parts. The private parts of the variable are
inferred from the dictionaries. These dictionaries are updated by the monitor
according to information flow.
However, the tracking mechanism used in this IFC has been shown to be less
efficient in write operations in comparison with read operations by the authors
themselves. Further, the IFC mechanism does not consider all possible informa-
tion flows and relies solely on over-approximation. We believe that with some
suitable changes to this model supplemented by learning, ASD could eventually
become adherent to TINI while becoming more efficient.
3 Description of our approach
As described in the section 1, our work is an extensio of the ASD approach.Therefore,
we describe the preliminaries regarding ASD in subsection 3.1. This is followed
by the description of the dependency graph which tracks the various secrets in
our approach in subsection 3.2. We finally discuss the evolution of the depen-
dency graph with information flows in subsection 3.3.
3.1 Preliminaries on ASD
ASD is an IFC where secret variables are split to store two different values in
their private and public addresses separately. The access to the secret value for
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Fig. 1: Address Split Design [12]
a given variable is determined by the function that refers to the variable. The
authors propose a dictionary data-structure to track the secret variables based
on the information flow. A mechanism called the dependency tracker (DT) keeps
track of the current statement and the list of secret values that are being used
in the current execution. The dictionaries are changed based on the DT at every
write into a variable.
An example of ASD’s working is shown in listing 1.1.
1 var a = 2;
2 function f1()
3 {
4 a = 3;
5 print(a);
6 var b = a;
7 };
8 f1();
Listing 1.1: ASD Example
Let us consider that variable a is secret and function f1 has access to a.
In that case, at the beginning of the function call, a = ⌈2p ∥ undefineds⌋. This
notation signifies that the variable a has been split. Here, a has a public value
that was initialized to 2 and a secret value that is undefined. However, when
executing function f1, in line 4, the secret value is changed. This is because f1
has access to the variable a. Therefore, a = ⌈2p ∥ 3s⌋.
In line 6, the variable a is read. Therefore, the dependency tracker is updated
and DT = {a}. When variable b is initialized, it is split. The public value remains
as undefined while the secret value is assigned as 3. Therefore, b= ⌈undefinedp ∥
3s⌋.
Further, any function that has access to a, is given access to b. Hence, the
function f1’s dictionary would be:
Variable Rights Address
a RW @(A)
scope(f1).b RW @(B)
Table 1: Dictionary of function f1
In the table 1, the notation “scope(f1).b” represents the local variable of the
function. Each run of the function generates a unique scope identifier which is
used to identify which instance of the local variable is being used. Hence, the
use of the scope identifier allows handling of local variables in all cases including
recursion.
Any function that is defined in the policy is called a self-sufficient function
and has its own dictionary. All other functions are called utility functions and
use the dictionary of the self-sufficient function that called them. To implement
the above mechanism, the symbol table is overloaded with a dictionary data-
structure in ASD. There is hence a unique dictionary for every function defined
in the policy.
ASD creates all dictionaries when interpreting the policies and changes every
dictionary based on the monitored information flow. This creates an increased
overhead when there is a large number of dictionaries. We hence propose another
data-structure called the dependency graph to keep track of the information flows
supplanting the existing dictionaries. We call this approach Address Split Design
with dependency graphs (ASD-DG). When the dependency graph is updated,
those changes will be noted by a learning mechanism. These learnt dependencies
will be applied to the variables at the end of the function’s execution. In the
next subsection we will discus the dependency graph and its working.
3.2 Dependency graph
The dependency graph is a tree data-structure which contains three types of
vertexes, namely, the function nodes, root nodes, and dependent nodes. The
function nodes represent the various self-sufficient functions, whereas the root
nodes and dependent nodes represent the various variables that contain secret
values. Root nodes are created for all variables represented in the policies. De-
pendent nodes are created when a variable contains a secret value originating
from another variable due to information flow.
In this paper, we describe the formalism along with the concepts involved
in our approach. The various initial suppositions are given in [DECLARATION].
Here, the various representations used throughout the rest of the paper have
been defined. We continue the representation used in ASD as part of the while
language. Most rules defined in ASD hold true to ASD-DG as well. We will
describe the rules that change in greater detail in parallel with the dependency
graph.
[DECLARATION]
Let,Variables (x ∈Var)
Functions ( f ∈ F ⊂Var)
Statements (S ∈ Stm)
State (s( f )→{public,secret})
Privilege (Priv ∈ {read,write,read +write})
Policy Specification (P(Var,F,Priv)→ Boolean)
Dictionary (D ∈ Dict)
Address Space[Var] (A[x] : Var→ Address)
Access Control
(
ACcontrol( f ,x) : (F,Var)→ boolean where,
control ∈ { (r)ead,(w)rite}
)
Dependency Trackerdt ∈ DT⊂Var
Dependency GraphDG
Dependency Graph StatesDGState{active,inactive}
Dependency Graph Nodes

DGnode where,
node ∈

root : "Root node",
f : "Function node"
d : "Dependent node"


Reinforced Learning L, collection of { ( f )unction,(dt),(v)ariable}
Flow Type {FL ∈ (e)xplicit,(i)implicit}
The dependency graph is used to maintain data about the various variables
that contain secret values due to information flow. It is a tree structure which
can be defined as
DG(V,E) where,

V is a set of vertexes
V ∋ {DG f ,DGroot ,DGd }
E is a set of edges
E ∋ {DG f → DGroot ,DGroot → DGd }

The structure of the dependency graph is a simple unidirectional that can
only consist of three layers. The edges are strictly only between the function
nodes to root nodes or root nodes to dependent nodes. Function nodes can have
any number of child root nodes. Similarly, there is no limitation on the num-
ber of child dependent nodes for root nodes. Root nodes can have two possible
states, active and inactive. When interpreting the graph, the functions can ac-
cess variables represented by any of the active root nodes with whom they share
an edge. The state modifications occur due to information flow. Such modifi-
cations are described in greater detail along with the evolution of the graph in
subsection 3.3. Finally, a function can access a dependent node if and only if it
has access to all root nodes which are parents to that dependent node. In the
formalism, the x⇝ f represents that f can access x. In the figure 2 f2 has access
to V6. However, it cannot access V5 because f2 cannot access V1.
An example of this data structure, can be seen in the figure 2.
V1
F1 F2
V3V2
V4 V5 V6 V7V8
Functions
Root nodes
Dependant nodes
Fig. 2: Dependency graph
When the variables contain secret values because of information flows, they
are added to the dependency graph. In our approach, we use the current DT to
assign parent nodes. The DT keeps track of the current set of secret values that
are influencing the information flow.
The rule [POLICY: FUNCTION READ ACCESS] describes the interpretation
of the policy into the dependency graph. The read access constructs the link
between the function nodes and the root nodes in the dependency graph. The
root nodes are the initial secrets. The other secrets are added to the dependency
graph because of information flows from the root nodes and hence become de-
pendent nodes. The main purpose of the dependency graph is to overload the
[POLICY: FUNCTION READ ACCESS]
P( f ,x,ACr)
DG f ← f ;DGroot ← x;x⇝ f
symbol table on a just in time basis as needed by the compiler. When a function
attempts to read a variable, the monitor checks the dependency graph to vali-
date the function’s permissions to perform the operation. The rules for accessing
the variable are given in [RUNTIME: FUNCTION READ ACCESS]. In this equation,
for a given policy, the function and variable are added to the dependency graph
and then f becomes a parent of x.
[RUNTIME: FUNCTION READ ACCESS]
f ∈ DG f ;x ∈ DG s.t. x⇝ f ,DGState(x) = active
ACr( f ,x) = true;s( f ) = secret
f ∈ DG f ;x ∈ DG s.t. x⇝ f ,DGState(x) ̸= active
ACr( f ,x) = false;
f ∈ DG f ;x ∈ DG ,DGState(x) = active,x⇝ f
ACr( f ,x) = false;
f ∈DG f ;
ACr( f ,x) = false;
x∈DG;
ACr( f ,x) = false;
3.3 Dependency graph evolution
In this section, we discuss the dependency graph’s evolution with the various
variables that are added to it over time. Variables evolve when a function per-
forms a write operation. There have been no changes in the write operation
from the original ASD in this paper. Since write permissions do not change be-
cause of information flow and are only present to protect the variable, they are
maintained as a simple list. When a function writes a secret value into a public
variable, this variable is split and added as a dependent node to the dependency
graph. If this split variable becomes dependent on another root, it is simply
moved to become a child of that root node. However, if a root node becomes
dependent on another root, a dependent node pointing to that variable is cre-
ated and original root node becomes inactive. An inactive root node exists only
for its children. This implies that the orignal root variable’s value has changed
but there are other existing variables which contain some information about the
value due to information flow.
Let us consider a statement, V2 = V4 + 4;. It can be observed in the figure 3
that the variable V2, which is a root variable has been changed. The figure shows
that by marking the root node V2 as a grayed out node. This implies that the
function does not have access to the variable represented by this node but it may
have access to the variables represented by its children. It can also be observed
that the variable V2 is now dependent on V1 and is indicated by a square in the
figure.
In ASD, every dictionary containing the variable required a change when the
variable was updated. However, dependency graph needs only a single operation
V1
F1 F2
V3V2
V4 V5 V6 V7V8
Functions
Root nodes
Dependant nodes
V2
Fig. 3: Dependency graph evolution
to be performed to the same effectiveness. Every time the dependency graph
changes, it is registered by the second part of model, the reinforcement learning
mechanism. The use and working of the learning mechanism is described in
greater detail in the following section.
4 Reinforcement learning
The evolution of the dependency graph is continuously monitored when a func-
tion is executed and this data is used to learn about the function’s characteristics.
The information collected is stored as a persistent data set to be used in sub-
sequent executions. The purpose of this learning is to understand the various
paths and loops that were taken in prior executions.
The information collected contains the following: the name of the function,
the dependency tracker at the time of the split, the variable being split/updated,
root variable and the layout of the relevant nodes in the dependency graph. Once
collected, this information is used to split/update variables at subsequent flows.
Let us consider the current state to be as shown as in the figure 2. We now
consider functions f4, f5, and f6 as shown in the listing 1.2.
1 // var V1 = secret(true/false);
2 var V10 = true;
3 var V11 = true;
4 function f4()
5 {
6 if (V1)
7 V10 = false;
8 if (V10)
9 V11 = false;
10 return V11;
11 };
12 function f5(x)
13 {
14 var y = x+1;
15 console.log(y);
16 };
17 function f6()
18 {
19 if(V10)
20 {f5(V10);}
21 else{f5(0);}
22 };
23 f4();
24 f6();
Listing 1.2: ASD Example
In this example, the variable V1 is a secret variable. Here we consider that the
functions f4 and f6 have read access to V1. The function f5 does not have access
to V1. If V1 = trues, in line 7, the public variable V10 becomes a secret. In the
dependency graph, its root node is V1. If V1= falses, in line 9, the public variable
V11 becomes a secret with its root node being V1 due to the over-approximation
of ASD.
1 [{function:"f4", rootVariable:"V1", split:"V10",
2 DT:[V1], dgInfo:[{"V1", "V10"}]},
3 {function:"f4", rootVariable:"V1", split:"V11",
4 DT:[V1], dgInfo:[{"V1", "V11"}]}]
Listing 1.3: ASD Example
The set of variable information shown in listing 1.3 is the persistent data set
that is maintained about the function f4 for the example 1.2. As stated above,
it contains information on dependency tracker at the time of the split as well
as the root node that was allocated as the parent to the variable at the end of
the information flow. Each time a variable is split or its secret value is updated
because of a dependency, a data set for the variable is created. This data set is
added to the a persistent array of data sets if not already present. This is hence
the “learnt data”.
Hence, at the end of the execution of function f4, it is noted that variable
V10 and V11 are dependent on the variable V1. This information is used for
later executions. Now, let us consider the same function such that variable V1 =
⌈falsep ∥ falses⌋. In this case, the line 7 is not executed. However, we know from
the prior execution that V10 is dependent on V1 based on DT at the time of
the split. Hence, V10 is split at the end of the execution and its private address
contains the value copied from its public address, i.e. V10 = ⌈truep ∥ trues⌋.
Whenever, a variable is split or updated due to information flows, the changes
to the dependency graph are noted into the learning mechanism. Therefore, it is
represented as part of the rules [VARIABLE UPGRADE] and [VARIABLE UPDATED].
These rules stipulate the various necessary steps when a new secret value flows
into a public variable and split variable respectively. In these rules, the v.root
represents the parent root node set the variable v and v.root ⇝x implies that the
node of the variable x becomes a child node to all the root nodes of variable v.
The rules show that a join operation is performed to the persistent set of learnt
data along with a successful variable update or split.
The rationale and the necessity for this split becomes evident in the execution
of the function f6. The table 2 illustrates the execution of function f6 if variable
V10 was split or not. It must be noted that f6 has read access to V1 according
to the policy definition.
[VARIABLE UPDATED]
f ∈ DG f ;x ∈ DG;x→ x′;ACw( f ,x) = true;dt = {}
xs← A[x′];x⇝ f ;L ⋊⋉ ( f ,x,dt)
f ∈ DG f ;x→ x′;ACw( f ,x) = true;dt ̸= {}
xs← A[x′];∀(v ∈ dt)v.root ⇝x;L ⋊⋉ ( f ,x,dt)
f ∈ DG f ;x→ x′;ACw( f ,x) = true;x ∈ DGroot ;dt ̸= {};
State(x) = inactive
f ∈ DG f ;x→ x′;ACw( f ,x) = true;dt ̸= {};x ∈ DGd
delete x ∈ DGd
f ∈ DG f ;x→ x′;ACw( f ,x) = false;
xp← A[x′];
f ∈DG f ;
xp← A[x′];
[VARIABLE UPGRADE]
f ∈ DG f ;dt ̸= {};S(y);y∈DG
A[ys];y← ⌈A[y]||A[ys]⌋;(∀v ∈ dt){v.root ⇝y};L ⋊⋉ ( f ,y,dt);
In the table 2 we show the execution of the function f6 after the function f4
has been executed. There are two columns where we compare ASD with ASD-
DG post learning has been completed. The two cases where V1 = trues and V1
= falses have been considered in this example.
The first major difference is caused because of V10 being split for both values
of V1 in case of ASD-DG post learning. Since the variable split is known, the DT
remains the same for both cases. However, this is not the case in simple ASD.
In the first case, the variable is added to the DT. The rule [SELF-SUFFICIENT
CALLED] [12] is invoked because f5 is also a self-sufficient function. Since f5 does
not have access to the V11, the function call is skipped. This is in line with the
dynamic policy enforcement where the secret addresses are not allowed to flow
into the public addresses.
[SELF-SUFFICIENT CALLED]{
S( f ); f ∈ DG f ;dt = {x};ACr( f ,x) = true;
}
s( f ) = secret;dt = {x};{
S( f ); f ∈ DG f ;dt = {x};ACr( f ,x) = false;FL = i
}
(Skip S( f )){
S( f ); f ∈ DG f ;dt = {x};ACr( f ,x) = false;FL = e
}
s( f ) = public;x→ A[x];dt = {};
{S( f );dt = {};}
S( f );
function f6() ASD ASD-DG post-learning
First case [V1=trues]
1. {if(V10 == 1) true, DT={V10} true, DT={V10}
2. {f5(V10);} f5(x); f5(x);
3. else{f5(0);}
4. }}
Second case [V1=falses]
1. {if(V10 == 1) false; DT={} false; DT={V10}
2. {f5(V10);}
3. else{f5(0);} DT={}; f5(0); DT={V10};f5(0);
4. }}
Table 2: ASD-DG working
The use of the dependency graph is to compensate for the deficiencies caused
by the rule [SELF-SUFFICIENT CALLED] in ASD. This rule is necessary to prevent
the secret from being leaked. However, it still can cause leak on whether the
variable was split. This occurs when a self-sufficient function fails to split a global
variable because of that branch not being executed and this global variable being
used in a subsequent self-sufficient function as a conditional in an implicit flow.
In the table 2, V10 being split affects the DT in line 1, therby allowing/denying the
execution of f5. While such a leak is only caused under specific circumstances,
and the actual secret value is never leaked, it nevertheless undesirable and makes
the model non-adherent to TINI. We aim to solve this issue through learning.
Adding the dependency graph approach, the model gradually closes up its leaks
and will eventually become adherant to TINI. Further, since the dependency
graph keeps track of the variables for every run, it can also observe dependencies
caused by the use of eval, every case of a switch case and other information
flows gradually over a period of time. Hence, the dependnency graph and how
it keeps track of various information flow is very important to the model.
The various information learnt is used by the rule [DG LEARNING - FUNCTION
ENDED]. At the end of the execution of the function f, if there is any past
secret information flow, additional IFC actions are performed. The learnt data
contains a set of function, dependency tracker and the dependent variable. If the
dependent variables have not already been split, a variable upgrade is performed
based on the dependency tracker. Else, a variable update is performed.
[DG LEARNING - FUNCTION ENDED]
exec( f )→ completed;L( f ) ̸=∅
(∀r ∈ L( f )){([VARIABLE UPGRADE]/[VARIABLE UPDATED])(r);}
4.1 Eventual TINI
It must be noted that the premise of our model starts with not being adherent
to TINI initially. This is because, ASD could leak state information of a variable
at the end of the execution of a function. This leak does not mean that secret
values would be printed but that it is possible to infer whether a public variable
has become a dependent node or not.
[Proof for TINI]
Let,
Functions
(
fh
∪
fl ≡
∀ f∈F∪
f
)
Public output functions ( f p ∈ fl)
Secret input xin.s
Proof:
(∀ f ∈ fh) : { f ← ACr( f ,x) = true;} (∀ f ∈ fl) : { f ← ACr( f ,x) = false;}
(∀ f ∈ fh) : { f ← ACw( f ,x) = true;} (∀ f ∈ fl) : { f ← ACw( f ,x) = false;}
A[xin.s] := A[xpin.s] A[xin.s] : ̸= A[x
s
in.s]
{ f (xin.s) | f ∈ fl ;}
f ←Vre f (xin.s);DG(x)←A[xin.s]
{ f (xin.s) | f ∈ fh;}
f ←Vre f (xsin.s);DG(x)← A[xsin.s]
S f p ← xin.s;FL = e
f p← A[xin.s];S f p ;
S f p ← xin.s;FL = i
(Skip S f p){
f (xin.s),y∈DG,y← x
∣∣ f ∈ fh;}
split(y); f ←Vre f (ys);DG(y)←A[ys];
∴
{
S f p(xsin.s)≡ S f p((x′
s
in.s)
∣∣ xin.s ≡ x′in.s }
However, xin.s ≡ x′in.s iff ∀x ∈ s,if {x ∈ DG} =⇒ {x′ ∈ DG}
=⇒ S f p(xsin.s)≊ sS f p((x′
s
in.s) iff ∀x ∈ s,if {x ∈ DG} =⇒ {x′ ∈ DG}
The [Proof for TINI] shows that ASD-DG is only adherent to TINI if
the same variables are split at the end of the execution of a given function for
different values of the secret. The reinforcement learning model solves this issue
by collecting information on the states of the various variables and simulating
these states at the end of each function. Hence, over time, all execution paths
would be covered and even dynamic flows like eval operations can be handled
to a certain extent. Since the learning model would eventually ensure that the
states of the variables would eventually be the same, the ASD-DG can be said
to be adherent to “eventual TINI”.
5 Conclusion
There is a clear and urgent need to address the various information leaks in the
context of JavaScript. The dynamic nature of the language makes the standard
approaches insufficient or inefficient. In this case, starting with a practical effi-
cient approach and making it adhere to more restrictive security guarantees over
time is more appropriate. We have proposed one such model and take the novel
approach of using learning in the runtime environment to achieve our goals of
“eventual TINI”. In this process, we have also proposed a proper change to the
architecture of ASD to become more efficient. Taking ASD as the base has also
allowes us to account for fine-grained function level policies. We hence, propose
this model as a viable IFC model for the modern web-browser. The future work
of the model is to work towards a complete web-browser implementation of the
proposed model.
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